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Mid-term Evaluation of the 2009-14 
European Parliament:  
Legislative activity and decision-making dynamics 
VoteWatch Europe* 
CEPS Special Report / July 2012 
Introduction 
A few months into the 7th legislative term of 2009-14, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty 
on 1 December 2009 conferred vast new competences on the European Parliament (EP). With 
new areas of legislation subjected to co-decision, the EP is now more powerful than ever. In 
the second half of its term, the EP’s political agenda is packed with tough budget 
negotiations and crucial legislative decision-making, such as on economic affairs. All of this 
is taking place with the 2014 elections looming on the horizon, requiring both the EP and 
individual political groups to show muscle and position themselves. It is thus high time to 
take a fresh look at EU decision-making to re-evaluate our understanding of its workings. To 
this end, this report analyses legislative activity in the European Union and coalition 
formation in the EP. It focuses on three items and their impact on the inter-institutional 
balance of power, as well as the power distribution inside the EP:  
-  the volume of legislative acts and use of procedures, which allows insight into legislative 
activity and the inter-institutional balance of power;  
-  the cohesion of party groups in the European Parliament; 
-  coalition formation in the EP, revealing the balance of power between the political 
groups. 
Contrasting the findings with what we expected based on the 2004-9 and previous legislative 
terms,1 it becomes evident that changes in the composition of the EP and the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty have had a marked impact on the institutions, in particular when we 
look beyond aggregates and break down results by policy areas. 
Indeed, the decision-making environment has been subject to profound changes in recent 
years. In addition to the extension of the EP’s legislative competences under the Lisbon 
Treaty, the 2004 and 2007 enlargements constituted shake-ups for the EU institutions that 
had to accommodate more, and more diverse, actors. Against all odds, however, decision-
making has not stalled; instead studies suggest that business-as-usual prevails in decision-
making. Moreover, the 2009 elections resulted in a more right-leaning European Parliament 
with two new groups potentially altering policy-making dynamics.  
The report proceeds as follows. First, section one analyses EU legislative activity and the use 
of the distinct legislative procedures. Based on this, we draw conclusions on the inter-
institutional balance of power. Second, we zoom in on the European Parliament and its 
                                                      
* This report was prepared by the VoteWatch Europe team including Lukas Obholzer, Doru 
Frantescu, Sara Hagemann, and Simon Hix. 
1 See Kaczyński, P.M. & De Clerck-Sachsse, J. (2009), “The European Parliament - more powerful, less 
legitimate? An outlook for the 7th legislature”, CEPS Working Documents, May 2009. 2 | VOTEWATCH EUROPE 
committees, focusing on which of the committees has won and lost out in terms of the 
number of legislative files falling under different procedures that afford varying degrees of 
influence. Third, and finally, we focus on party groups in the European Parliament and their 
performance with regard to voting cohesion and the coalitions in which they vote. By 
disaggregating data on the latter aspect by policy area, we analyse the balance of power 
inside the EP. The Glossary at the end of this paper spells out the acronyms used to denote 
parties and procedures and European bodies. 
I.  Legislative activity and use of procedures: lessons for the inter-
institutional balance of power 
The number of legislative proposals adopted by the European Commission is an indicator of 
EU legislative activity and sets the agenda for the Parliament and Council.2 On average, co-
legislators require about 19 months to agree on a final text under co-decision.3 In this respect, 
the activity of the Commission foreshadows what will be on their plate in the coming 
months and years – in other words, the workload of the co-legislators. First, we consider the 
overall level of Commission activity with regard to inter-institutional legislative proposals.4 
Second, we analyse the choice of procedures, which is meaningful as the different 
procedures tip the balance of power of the institutions in favour of specific EU institutions. 
We therefore break down the proposals of the Commission by the procedure under which 
they fall.  
a.  Commission activity on legislative proposals 
The number of new proposals introduced by the Commission plummeted in recent years 
and hit rock bottom in 2010 with 122 new proposals, representing the lowest point of the 18-
year period that we cover here (cf. Figure 1). We can offer three possible explanations for this 
startling development, only reversed in 2011, when the legislative machinery gathered pace 
again: first, a political preference for less legislation; second, a focus on closing files to avoid 
lengthy new negotiations on files with legislative bases shifting to co-decision under the 
Lisbon Treaty; or, third, the decision to refrain from adopting certain proposals until entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which would extend co-decision to new areas and thus allow 
the EP a more powerful role. In the following, we will first analyse the data in more depth, 
before turning to the three possible explanations. 
Throughout the last 18 years, there are cyclical up- and downturns in the total numbers of 
initiatives that correspond to the terms of the Commission and the European Parliament. In 
line with the legislative cycle, activity peaked in the pre-election years 1998 and 2003, when 
circa 300 files were published, and slumped in between, as new colleges of Commissioners 
coming into office with new policy preferences require time to translate these into initiatives. 
Clearly, however, this cannot explain the drop and its extent after 2008.  
   
                                                      
2 Data from the European Parliament Legislative Observatory (www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/).  
3 Statistics for EP7 until 14 March 2012 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/code/about/statistics_en.htm).  
4 It should be noted that this is not the only measurement of legislative activity. First, we do not break 
down the proposals according to whether they constitute entirely new initiatives, or for instance acts 
that amend or update existing legislation. Second, we only look at inter-institutional procedures. MID-TERM EVALUATION OF THE 2009-14 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT| 3 
Figure 1. Legislative activity, 1994-2011 
 
 
What is so special about the previous (2004-09) and current (2009-12) terms? The last term 
was at first characterised by a more even output overall. This changed in 2008, when, 
contrary to our expectations for a pre-election year, the output of proposals was more than 
one quarter lower than five years earlier, and more than one eighth lower than in the 
preceding year. This marked the starting point for an unusual, puzzling downward 
deviation from the regularities of the preceding years. 
This decrease continued in 2009 and 2010, when the number of new proposals was less than 
half of the 2006 value. The trend was only reversed in 2011. In order to be able to 
meaningfully compare the output of proposals, we need to account for the legislative cycle. 
Figure 2 compares output by the year of the legislative term and points towards a downward 
trend in legislative proposals put forward by the Commission (data is by calendar year). 
Despite the 2011 increase, the downward trend holds when accounting for the phase of the 
legislative cycle.5 
   
                                                      
5 Information on proposals adopted by the Commission, and their work programme, can be found at 
(http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/programmes/docs/execution_report_2012.pdf and 
http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/programmes/docs/forward_programming_2012.pdf). 
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Figure 2. Legislative activity, 1994-2011 
 
 
To come to the three possible explanations for the developments: 
The first explanation is in line with the Commission’s call for less but better legislation, and 
is often linked to the name of the Secretary General, Catherine Day, who vowed to decrease 
the number of legislative initiatives with the backing of President Barroso. Previous studies 
pointed to the more assertive role of the Secretariat General of the Commission, which makes 
it far harder for proposals to be adopted. Rigorous policy planning and stringent impact 
assessments make it a ‘gatekeeper’ vis-à-vis the different Directorate Generals seeking “to 
limit the number of policy priorities and initiatives” (Kurpas, Gron & Kaczyński, 2008, p.44).6 
Second, at the same time, the decrease in new initiatives might be due to a re-allocation of 
resources towards closing files before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Since new 
policy areas – including agriculture and fisheries, freedom, security and justice, as well as 
cohesion policy – were to shift to co-decision, this would have meant re-opening the 
discussions, leading to more protracted decision-making.  
Finally, again with a view to the imminent extension of co-decision to these areas, the 
Commission may have delayed some initiatives until after the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, seeing as a more powerful European Parliament – usually considered as its ally – 
might help the Commission with achieving its preferences. Administrative politics would, 
according to this view, reinforce a temporary decrease in new proposals in the shadow of 
Lisbon. 
Since the different legislative procedures come with different powers for the institutions, the 
next section will focus on the use of different legislative procedures over time. 
 
 
 
                                                      
6 S. Kurpas, C. Gron and P.M. Kaczyński (2008), “The European Commission after Enlargement: Does 
More Add Up to Less?”, CEPS Special Report, February. 
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b.  Use of procedures: co-decision as the ordinary legislative procedure 
Figure 3. Use of procedures by per cent 
 
 
Legislative activity is dominated by consultation (CNS) and co-decision (ordinary legislative 
procedure, OLP), with their shares having a marked impact on the balance of power between 
the institutions. Comparing the use of procedures means that numbers can be put to the 
observation that the Lisbon Treaty shifted legislative bases to co-decision and shows just 
how significant a reform the Lisbon Treaty is for legislative decision-making: the EP matters 
more than ever.  
Before the Lisbon Treaty, Parliament had already gained more powers under successive 
treaty changes, shifting more legislative bases to co-decision. Accordingly, the number of 
OLP-proposals caught up with the dropping tally of CNS-files. In 2008, for the first time 
there were more new files under co-decision than under the consultation procedure. After a 
one-off, minimal reversal of the trend in 2009, the drastic shift in use of procedures after 
Lisbon becomes evident. Figure 3 provides powerful evidence of the change: in 2010 and 
2011, 90% and 86% respectively of the acts fell under the ordinary legislative procedure, 
while 7% and 11% respectively fell under consultation. Even though the absolute number of 
co-decision files does not reach the levels of consultation seen in the 1990s, it surpasses 
consultation in its degree of preponderance (Figure 3). Co-decision is indeed the ordinary 
legislative procedure: the name is the game. The spread between the two procedures is 
bigger now than ever in the last 15 years. The cooperation procedure (SYN) that was 
abolished in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam only marginally contributes to the overall 
picture, as does the assent/consent procedure (AVC/APP), which now applies, for instance, 
to anti-discrimination policy, some budgetary decisions and many international agreements.  
The shift from consultation to co-decision leaves the EP as the clear winner, strengthening its 
hand vis-à-vis the Council. For the Commission, the picture is more ambiguous. While is has 
forfeited its role as the negotiating partner of the Council, which it holds in the consultation 
procedure, it may have lost power rather than de facto influence, as this concomitantly 
strengthened the EP, which is often considered as an ally of the Commission.  
This increase in powers for the EP comes with an increase in workload, to which the 
institution needs to adapt. In the next section we look at the differential impact this has on 
committees in the EP, before considering its effect on legislative behaviour of party groups. 
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II.  Who wins, who loses? EP Committees and the increase in powers 
The bulk of the legislative work in the European Parliament takes place in its 22 committees 
focusing on specific policy areas, according to which proposals are divided amongst them. 
Committees take power and prestige from various sources: highly political topics such as 
those dealt with by the Foreign Affairs Committee, landmark negotiations such as those on 
the EU budget, high-profile files such as those on ACTA, and their basic legislative duties. 
This section seeks to provide insight into the volume of legislation passing through nine 
selected committees over the last eight years. In December 2009 the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty doubled the legislative bases subject to co-decision by expanding its scope to 
policies such as agriculture and fisheries, services liberalisation, the common commercial 
policy, as well as freedom, security and justice. Here we analyse the number of co-decision 
and consultation files assigned to committees as an indicator of their influence over 
legislation.  
The legislative role of committees and that of the rapporteur appointed from among the 
MEPs sitting on it has become increasingly prominent, as more co-decision files are closed 
via informal first-reading agreements.7 In this term, 77% of co-decision files had been agreed 
before the text was tabled in plenary (cf. fn. 3), effectively sidelining MEPs from other 
committees. Power in the EP has thus shifted to committees, and MEPs on committees with 
many (co-decision) files have a better chance of influencing legislation. However, influence 
may be both a blessing and a curse: committees, political groups and individual MEPs need 
to cope with different and potentially greater workloads. This is already higher in the EP 
than in most European national parliaments, presenting a formidable challenge to smaller 
groups in particular, for which one or two MEPs on a committee need to follow all files. 
When comparing the development of responsibilities for consultation and co-decision files, 
we will focus on nine committees that deserve particular attention, given their activities 
and/or changes in their competences. Classifying these trends in the following typology, we 
encounter three of the four ideal types, and refrain from classifying two ambiguous cases 
(ITRE, ECON).  
Table 1. Typology of trends in committee influence 
  Less legislation  More legislation 
Less co-decision  ENVI, TRAN  - 
More co-decision  PECH, AGRI, LIBE  INTA, IMCO 
More quantity, more quality: INTA and IMCO as winners 
The international trade and internal market and consumer protection committees are the 
clear winners of the term so far with regard to the legislation referred to them. It should be 
noted however that this assessment is based on trends in the respective committees’ activity 
rather than a comparison across committees.8 Having not traditionally been committees with 
a high legislative output, the new competencies mean more pieces of legislation with 
substantial power for MEPs sitting on INTA and IMCO. This gives rise to the question of 
how the more prominent parliamentary involvement will change the content of legislation; a 
question that will need to be answered at a later stage. 
                                                      
7 Obholzer, L. & Reh, C. (2012), “How to Negotiate under Co-decision in the EU: Reforming Trilogues 
and First-Reading Agreements”, CEPS Policy Brief No. 270. 
8 For instance, the LIBE committee, discussed below, is involved in more co-decision files than the 
IMCO committee. MID-TERM EVALUATION OF THE 2009-14 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT| 7 
Figure 4. Legislative activity, INTA and IMCO committees, 2004-2011 
 
Quality rather than quantity: less legislation, more co-decision in PECH, AGRI, and LIBE 
The second group comprises the agriculture, fisheries and civil liberties sectors. These have 
in common an overall decrease in the volume of legislation channelled through the 
committees, while the files come with more influence for the committee; in other words: less 
quantity, more quality. 
The fisheries and agriculture committees in general exhibit modest legislative activity, with 
consultation phasing out steadily and being replaced by co-decision, which was barely 
present before. Civil liberties, by contrast, dealt with a considerable amount of legislation 
before, including some co-decision files. Nevertheless, the pattern holds: overall legislative 
activity dropped markedly, while co-decision has been on the rise in the last few years. 
Figure 5. Legislative activity, PECH, AGRI, and LIBE committees, 2004-2011 
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Fading activity: ENVI and TRAN 
In other policy areas, legislative activity has diminished. Thus, we note an overall decline in 
the number of legislative files, and, unlike for the PECH, AGRI and LIBE committees 
presented above, there has not been a qualitative leap for the committee in the proportion of 
co-decision files dealt with. The environment and transport committees are cases in point.  
Figure 6. Legislative activity, ENVI and TRAN committees, 2004-2011 
 
Jury still out: ITRE and ECON 
At the same time, the classification of ECON shows the limits of this quantitative analysis. 
Without doubt, the quality of legislation for MEPs extends beyond the binary co-decision 
and consultation question to actual content. Here, in times of crisis, ECON has of course 
played a central role in deciding on crucial pieces of legislation, such as the six-pack on 
economic governance. But when disregarding this qualification, it is important to further 
follow these committees before classifying them according to the typology presented above. 
Figure 7. Legislative activity, ECON and ITRE committees, 2004-2011 
 
III.  Parties and the increase in powers: coalitions  
With parliamentary powers so clearly expanded, more is at stake for party groups in the 
European Parliament. Most groups have reacted to this by voting more cohesively than 
during last legislative term, as Figure 8 reveals.9 However, it should be stressed that the 
                                                      
9 Party group cohesion measures the extent to which the MEPs of a European Party Group vote as a 
block. The higher the score, the more cohesive the group. The formula and further explanations on the 
determination of a group position and voting blocks can be found online in the VoteWatch Guide 
(http://www.votewatch.eu/en/votewatch-guide.html).  
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•  Environment: We observe a reverse trend in environment, where the EPP, S&D and 
ALDE vote together even less often than before, down by 1.28 points to 51.87%. Here it is 
the centre-left that now runs the show: the centre-left coalition wins three times as often 
as the centre-right coalition. This is due to a 9.96-point increase in the former, now 
forming on one third of the votes, while the latter occurs on 10.94% of votes, implying a 
6.19-point decrease when compared to EP6. 
•  Fisheries: Consensus between the three groups in this sector increased by 3.21 points, so 
that the groups vote together on nearly three quarters of votes (72%). Remarkably, ALDE 
is outvoted by the two biggest party groups on one fifth of votes, whilst these are 
individually outvoted on 4% of votes only. 
•  Industry, Research and Technology: Votes have become less consensual, with a grand 
coalition forming 4.87 points less often, in 57.48% of votes. This is in particular due to 
S&D being on the losing side 50% more often than last term (a 5.39 point increase to 
14.96%), while the established pattern from EP6 holds for the EPP and ALDE, being 
outvoted on about 21% and 6%, respectively. 
•  Internal Market and Consumer Protection: Whilst it should be interpreted with caution, 
as only 38 roll-calls have been recorded so far, evidence so far points to a much higher 
share of grand coalitions, which now form on almost 79% of votes (up from 59.23%). This 
benefits S&D, now outvoted on 15.79% of votes instead of about one quarter of votes. 
EPP and ALDE are outvoted on 2.63% of votes each, down from 6.54% and 8.46%, 
respectively. 
•  International Trade: Grand coalitions form on slightly more than two thirds of votes, 
representing a 5-point increase from EP6. This includes a minimal shift towards the 
centre-left, with S&D outvoted slightly less often (on 17.69% of votes), and the EPP being 
outvoted slightly more often (on 13.85% of votes) than last term. In particular, however, 
ALDE is more often part of the winning coalition, as it opposes EPP and S&D on only 
1.54% of votes. 
•  Transport:  With only 45 roll-call votes in the policy area to date under EP7, the 
significance of any shifts should not be overstated. That being said, voting behaviour was 
more consensual between the three groups, leading to grand coalitions on 80% of votes; 
an 18.48-point increase. This development benefits the two biggest groups, now outvoted 
on 4.44% of votes each, which implies an 11.48-point decrease for S&D and a 5.64-point 
decrease for the EPP. 
This clearly reveals that the explanatory power of the aggregate values is only of limited 
value. Disaggregating the data by policy area clearly reveals the variation and marked 
differences in the balance of power. The next section focuses on this in more depth. 
b.  Coalitions and conflict across policy areas in EP7/I 
Clashes among the three central party groups influence whether the balance of power 
swings to the centre-left or centre-right. To what extent does this differ by policy area? Who 
wins, who loses? 
First, we consider the degree of consensus between the three central groups. Taking the 
overall total as baseline, we can contrast the more and less consensual policy areas. With two 
thirds of votes in total being carried by grand coalitions, we find a higher level of consensus 
in international trade (67%), fisheries (72% of 75 votes), internal market and consumer 
protection (79% of 38 votes) as well as transport policy (80% of 45 votes). However, this 
broad consensus is harder to find in the six other policy areas that we analyse: agriculture 12 | VOTEWATCH EUROPE 
(64%), economic and monetary policy (54%), civil liberties (53%), and environmental policy 
(52%).  
Second, we look at the question of which policy areas are prone to centre-right as opposed to 
centre-left voting blocks. As the biggest group in the EP, one might expect the EPP to be 
opposed less often than either S&D or ALDE. Indeed, we find a higher share of centre-right 
voting blocks as opposed to centre-left voting blocks in agriculture (EPP and ALDE opposing 
S&D in 16% of votes), internal market and consumer protection (16%), international trade 
(18%), and – more than anywhere else – in economic and monetary policy (40%). On the 
contrary, we find predominant centre-left majorities in industry, research and energy (S&D 
and ALDE opposing EPP in 22% of votes), civil liberties, justice, and home affairs (28%), and 
environment (33%). In fisheries policy, as well as in transport policy, centre-right and centre-
left each only command 4% of votes. This is partly due to high levels of consensus between 
the groups, and because the two largest groups form coalitions sidelining ALDE in 20% of 
cases in fisheries policy and in 11% of votes in transport (as well as in 15% of agricultural 
policy votes). 
In practice, the balance of power thus swings both ways, and the direction depends heavily 
on the policy area. 
Outlook: what to watch, and how 
This report has assessed EU legislative activity at mid-term of the 7th legislative term. This 
section draws together some of the insights and highlights the issues we should keep a close 
eye on. 
We started off by presenting data on the legislative activity of the Commission, showing that 
after a decline in the adoption of new proposals in recent years, 2011 witnessed resurgence in 
activity. In particular, the steep increase in co-decision, which is now deployed for about 90% 
of the legislative proposals, shows the impact of the Lisbon Treaty in extending the influence 
of the EP. But how will these figures look for 2012 and beyond? The Commission provides 
information on its legislative agenda, which allows for a tracking of the adopted proposals 
and plans (cf. fn.5). This allows us to monitor whether 2011 was a one-off exception or the 
beginning of a trend towards a more active Commission in the second half of its term. In due 
course, it will likewise be possible to make more informed assessments of the reasons for and 
the extent of the preponderance of co-decision over consultation as a decision-making 
procedure. This will shed light on the question of whether the current figures are only 
temporarily inflated. 
These two issues are also at the heart of the second section, which broke down the type and 
number of acts by parliamentary committee. This identified distinct developments in the 
influence of committees: there are clear winners and losers in terms of the quantity of 
legislation and quality of legislation dealt with. It remains to be seen whether the trends and 
thus the classifications of the committees hold in the long run. This can be tackled by 
analysing data available online from the EP’s legislative observatory. Importantly, this is also 
possible for any other policy area/committee beyond those presented here. A question 
implicit in the analysis is to what extent the shift towards co-decision denotes a qualitative 
turn in the substance of legislation: what difference does EP involvement make? This is more 
of a challenge and would require in-depth sectoral studies. 
When finally looking at party group cohesion and voting blocks in the EP, we revealed that 
parties vote on average more cohesively in EP7/I than in EP6, and that grand coalitions of 
the three central groups – EPP, S&D, and ALDE – have occurred more regularly than during 
the last term. EPP and S&D were outvoted on about 14% of votes, whilst ALDE was MID-TERM EVALUATION OF THE 2009-14 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT| 13 
outvoted on only about 5.5% of votes. We then disaggregated these total values by policy 
areas and showed their distinct decision-making dynamics over time. Finally, we compared 
voting alignments across policy areas, thus analysing in which direction the balance of 
power swings. The proportion of grand coalitions ranged from 52% in environmental policy, 
to 79% in internal market and consumer protection, while other policy areas are clearly 
dominated by the centre right (e.g. economic and monetary affairs) or centre-left (e.g. 
environment). Interested readers can follow as to whether these trends hold, as well as how 
these compare to the other policy areas left aside here, by tracking voting behaviour on 
VoteWatch.eu.  
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Glossary 
 
ACTA  Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
AGRI  Agriculture and Rural Development 
ALDE  Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe 
ECON  Economic and Monetary Affairs 
ECR  European Conservatives and Reformists Group 
EFD  Europe of freedom and democracy Group 
ENVI  Environment, Public Health and Food Safety 
EP European  Parliament 
EPP  Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) 
EU European  Union 
Greens/EFA  Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance 
GUE/NGL  Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left 
IMCO  Internal Market and Consumer Protection 
INTA International  Trade 
ITRE  Industry, Research and Energy 
LIBE  Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 
MEP  Member of the European Parliament 
NI Non-attached  Members 
PECH Fisheries 
S&D  Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists & Democrats in the 
European Parliament 
TRAN  Transport and Tourism 
OLP Ordinary  Legislative Procedure 
CNS Consultation  procedure 
AVC Assent  procedure 
APP Consent  procedure 
SYN  Cooperation procedure  
 